I. Background 1
The decision to contribute without pay to freely available software may seem mysterious to economists. The unpaid programmer working on an open-source software development project, however, faces a variety of benefits and costs. The programmer incurs an opportunity cost of time, which can manifest itself in different ways. For example, a programmer who works as an independent on open-source projects forgoes the earnings that could come from working for a commercial firm or a university. For a programmer with a commercial company, university, or research lab affiliation, the opportunity cost of working on open-source software comes from not focusing on other tasks. For example, the academic's research output may drop and the student's progress toward a degree may slow.
Several short-or long-run benefits may counter these costs (Lerner and Tirole, 2002) . First, open-source programmers may improve rather than reduce their performance in paid work. This outcome is particularly relevant for system administrators looking for specific solutions. Second, the programmer may find intrinsic pleasure if choosing a "cool" open source is more fun than a routine task set by an employer. Third, in the long run, open-source contributions may lead to future job offers, shares in commercial open-source-based companies, future access to the venture capital market, and ego gratification from peer recognition. Different programmers may put different values on monetary or personal payoffs, and on short-term or long-term payoffs.
Economic theory suggests that long-term incentives are stronger under three conditions: (a) the more visible the performance to the relevant audience (peers, labor market, and venture capital community); (b) the higher the impact of effort on performance; and (c) the more informative the performance about talent (for example, Bengt Holmström, 1999) . The first condition gives rise to what economists call "strategic complementarities." To have an "audience," programmers will want to work on software projects that will attract a large number of other programmers. This argument suggests the possibility of multiple equilibria. The same project may attract few programmers because programmers expect other programmers will not be interested; or it may flourish as programmers (rationally) have faith in the project.
When we consider the delayed rewards of working on an open-source project, the ability to signal a high level of competence may be stronger in the open-source mode for three reasons. First, in an open-source project, outsiders can see the contribution of each individual, whether that component "worked," whether the task was hard, if the problem was addressed in a clever way, whether the code can be useful for other programming tasks in the future, and so forth. Second, the open-source programmer takes full responsibility for the success of a subproject, with little interference from a superior, which generates information about ability to follow through with a task. Finally, since many elements of the source code are shared across open-source projects, more of the knowledge they have accumulated can be transferred to new environments, which makes programmers more valuable to future employers. To compare programmers' incentives in the open source and proprietary settings, we need to examine how the features of the two environments shape incentives. From the standpoint of the individual, commercial projects typically offer better current compensation than open-source projects, because employers are willing to offer salaries to software programmers with the expectation that they will capture a return from a proprietary project.
Commercial The code-release strategy arises when companies release some existing proprietary code and then create a governance structure for the resulting open-source development process. This strategy is akin to giving away the razor (the released code) to sell more razor blades (for instance, the related consulting services that IBM and HP hope to provide). In general, it will make sense for a commercial company to release proprietary code under an open-source license if the increase in profit in the proprietary complementary segment offsets any profit that would have been made in the primary segment, had it not been converted to open source. Thus, the temptation to go open source is particularly strong when the product is lagging behind the leader and making few profits, but the firm sees a possibility that if the released code becomes the center of an open-source project and is utilized more widely, the profitability of the complementary segment will increase.
II. The Sample
We built a panel dataset of the contributors to approximately 100 open-source projects (for full details on the dataset, see Lerner et al., 2006) . These projects are stratified to overrepresent the largest open-source projects. We extract the contributors to the project in each new official version of the program that has been released, using a variety of text editing tools. Table 1 summarizes the projects and highlights that they differ considerably in their size and other characteristics. Open-source projects periodically introduce new versions. The number of versions introduced between the beginning of data collection and July 2004 varies between one and 20. 2 We obtained information on the projects from SourceForge (the leading on-line depository of open-source projects), press searches, and project Web sites. Key information includes the type of license of the project, whether venture capitalists funded the company, and whether a corporation released some of its code as an open-source project.
For each project, we opened the Tape Archive (known as "tarball") to count the number of distinct references to each individual contributor. The archive preserves information such as user and group permissions, dates, and directory structures. Open-source projects are scrupulous about keeping track of contributors, which reflects the fact that giving credit to authors is essential in the open-source movement. This principle is included as part of the nine key requirements in the "Open-Source Definition." 3 This point is also emphasized by Eric Raymond (1999) , who points out "surreptitiously filing someone's name off a project is, in cultural context, one of the ultimate crimes." This point was also emphasized in our conversations with open-source project managers and SourceForge officials. Each project release was then associated with a set of e-mails that appeared in the archive. 4 We aimed to distinguish individuals who were contributing code on their own behalf from those doing so as part of their employment. Our approach divided the contributors into five classes based on their e-mail addresses: corporate employees, individual hobbyists, * Measured at the end of the sample. ** BSD is an unrestrictive license, LGPL is restrictive, and GPL is highly restrictive. Three projects changed their license during our sample period: Sendmail, PureFTPd, Wine. We take the license post-change.
three classes of otherwise "other" contributors, unidentified international contributors, and those from organizations with top-level domains (TLDs) denoted ".org" and ".net," which frequently indicate nonprofit and technical Web sites. We included as corporate contributors all those with a ".com" address, excluding those sites used primarily as e-mail mailboxes, Internet service providers (ISPs), or portals (e.g., "hotmail.com"). We also included overseas addresses that are associated with corporations (for instance, "co.uk" and "caldera.de"). We included as hobbyists contributions by individuals affiliated with universities and governments (again, employing both addresses with TLDs such as ".edu" and overseas domains like "umontreal.ca"), as well as those who made contributions from addresses associated with portals, ISPs, and mailboxes. 5 The remaining categories-those from TLDs ".org" and ".net," as well as the remaining international domains-were not classified in either category, but rather treated separately, because we were not able to readily assign them. Table 2 presents details of characteristics of contributors.
III. Analysis of Project Contributions
Our initial analysis seeks to understand the distribution of contributions to open-source project by class of contributor, focusing on contributions by corporations and "hobbyists." Table 3 presents some breakdowns, using the most direct measure: the number of contributions by each class of contributor for various classes of projects. This table presents the proportion of all contributions that are corporate. 6 The table also presents the result of F-and t-tests of the significance of the reported differences.
The table shows the share of corporate contributions is twice as large in the largest quartile of projects as in the smallest quartile. The pattern is similar, though somewhat less dramatic, when we compare the versions divided into quartiles based on their growth rates, defined here as the difference between the number of lines of code in the current and previous version. Both differences are highly statistically significant.
Patterns regarding license type and venture capital backing are less sharp. The share of corporate contributions is lowest among those projects with the most restrictive licenses (see Lerner and Tirole, 2005b , for a discussion of our typology of license types), but there is no consistent relationship between license strength and corporate contributions. Corporate contributions are more common when venture capitalists have funded a company that is focusing on the open-source project, but this difference is not statistically significant. Finally, consistent with the results regarding project size, corporate contributions are more common in later versions of projects.
IV. Conclusions
This paper presents only the beginnings of understanding cross-sectional and time-series patterns of contributions to open-source projects. In the approximately 100 software projects we track from 2001 to 2004, we have shown that the share of corporate contributions is much larger in large and growing projects. In a companion paper, we develop a theoretical rationale for these patterns and explore them in more depth. 
